

Timor-Leste:
From Occupation to Independence

Summer Starr
Political Science 610
Professor John Wilson
Spring 2010

Table of Contents

	Page
Background	2
Location	
Pre-Colonial History	
Contemporary Timor Leste	
Historical State Powers	4
Colonial Rule	
WWII	
Indonesia	
The Pathway Towards Independence	9
Legitimacy	15
Self Determination	18
Conclusion	18
Appendix	20
Works Cited	21

BACKGROUND

Location

East Timor/Timor Leste/Timor Lorosae is located in Southeast Asia (see Appendix). As the name suggests, East Timor comprises the eastern half of the island of Timor and is slightly larger than the United State of Connecticut (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency). The terrain is highly mountainous, which contributes not only to the cultural aspects of Timor Leste, but has also historically played a significant role in political struggles, with regards to harboring revolutionary groups and offering asylum for refugees from the city during times of conflict. The weather is hot, tropical and humid with very distinct dry and rainy seasons (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency). This climate has proven beneficial for the establishment of plantation style agriculture, such as coffee, cotton, and sugar. Clearly the plantation agricultural model is politically and economically problematic, as it has been across the globe for centuries. Timor-Leste is geographically near Indonesia and for this reason, despite historical violence; Timor-Leste has maintained relations with Indonesia.

Pre-Colonial History

It has been discovered, through archaeological evidence, that humans settled the landmass of Timor some 40,000 years ago and evidence of agricultural activity has been found to date back as far 3,000 B.C.E (Glover 1977, 42). Due to this early settlement, Timor had developed into a complex arena of various tribal groups that identified through language and culture. Upon being “discovered” by European explorers, it was reported that the island had an intricate system of Kingdoms, Princedomes, and Chiefdoms . These

divisions were typically ethnically identified but not necessarily ethnically divided.

Different migrations have included those from Australia, New Guinea, Austronesians, and Malay (Glover 1977b, 43). Timor has a long history of sustaining a wide variety of different ethnic and cultural groups, and an extensive array of linguistic groups.

Contemporary Timor Leste

- Governmental Structure (as of January 2010)
 - Official Titles:
 - Tetum: Repúblika Demokrátika Timór Lorosa'e
 - Portuguese: República Democrática de Timor-Leste
 - English: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
 - President: Democratically elected for a five-year term. The current president is José Ramos Horta and is the second democratically elected president in the country. The 2002 elections resulted in a 98% voter turnout and the 2007 elections boasted an 80% voter turnout. (USAID).
 - Prime Minister: José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão
 - Parliament: Single chamber with 65 members
 - Political Parties: (5) Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (Fretilin, Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste); Partido Democrático (PD, Democratic Party); Partido Socialista Democrata (PSD, Democratic Socialist Party); Associação Social-Democrata de Timor (ASDT, Timorese Association of Social Democrats), Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução de Timor (CNRT, National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) (Economist 2010, 4)
- Social Dynamics
 - Religion: over 90% of the population is Catholic. This is a drastic increase from recent decades: 1973: 27%, 1989: 81%, 1999: 90%. (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) The Catholic Church worked to incorporate, some say co-opt, local belief systems into the stories told during service. During Indonesian occupation the government offered five sanctioned religions, of which Catholicism was one. During this occupation the Catholic Church was a locus of resistance, which accounts for much of its recent increase in numbers. In the flight to the Catholic Church, which was often sympathetic to the resistance, Muslim populations decreased (Carey 1995, 183).
 - Official Languages:
 - Portuguese. Despite the irony that Portuguese is representative of the long colonial occupation by Portugal, in an effort to depose Indonesian power, Portuguese became the language of resistance.
 - Tetum. One of many indigenous dialects.

- Working Languages:
 - Portuguese
 - English
 - Bahasa Indonesian
 - Local dialects (Economist 2010, 4)
- Economic Structure
 - 90% of the workforce is employed within the agricultural industry: coffee, rice, corn, peanut, cassava, sweet potatoes, soybeans, cabbage, mangoes, bananas, candlenut, coconut, vanilla (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency)
 - 30% of the non-petroleum based GDP for the country is from agriculture, of which coffee is the highest earner (The World Bank).
 - U.S. Dollar introduced in 2000 and used as the currency
 - East Timor centavo introduced in 2003. It is used in conjunction with the U.S. Dollar and has the same value as U.S. coin currency.
 - As of 2009, according to the World Bank, Timor-Leste is defined as a “Lower Middle Income” Economy.
 - The country has oil resources that are being extracted and because of this revenue, the country has an estimated \$300 million of secure income that can be utilized for the country's budget each year (Economist 2010, 9).

HISTORICAL STATE POWERS

Colonial Rule

In the 16th century, Portuguese explorers came upon Timor (Rae 2009, 40). After settling, the Portuguese were heavily involved in the trade of sandalwood. Unfortunately the timber practices were unsustainable and nearly sent the sandalwood in Timor into an extinction (Gunn 1999, 58). Due to the decrease in the sandalwood trade, in the 19th century plantation agriculture was established. Crops such as sugar, cotton, and coffee were popular exports.

1904 marked a significant year in Timorese history in that a treaty drafted in 1859 between “Dutch Timor” and “Portuguese Timor” was ratified (Gunn 1999, 72). This virtually split Timor in half, the Dutch taking the west end of the island, and Portugal

taking the East end. Consistent throughout the colonial occupation of East Timor, there has been resistance by indigenous groups as well as resistance alliances developed with settler communities.

- 1719: Unsuccessful armed insurrection against the colonial government
- 1895-1912: Sustained armed revolt, led by Dom Boaventura, which challenged Portuguese authority in Timor. The revolt was eventually defeated by Portuguese military force.
- 1910: Portuguese monarchy was unable to maintain legitimacy and was therefore deposed.

In 1928, the Finance Minister, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, gained an unusual amount of influence. He outlined the principles for what he called the “*Estado Novo*”, an organicist republic. This *Estado Novo* “New State” would be: based upon “*patriotic unity and be free from the disorders of individualism, parliamentarianism, and partisan spirit*” (Kingsbury 2009, 37). This era has been described as a fascist dictatorship, which remained as such, relatively unchanged, until 1974.

WWII

World War II was one of multiple turning points in the history of East Timor. In 1941 Australian and Dutch troops landed on East Timor. This was despite vocal protests from the citizenry and administration of East Timor, who had wanted to maintain a neutral status in the war. As a result of the troop presence, Japan invaded East Timor and what proceeded with what was one of the most violent occupations the country has ever experienced. After the invasion, the Portuguese relinquished control to the Japanese

military. The occupation killed 13% of the population (40,000-60,000), forced many into labor camps, and utilized systematic rape as a tool of war. Eventually, with losses worldwide, Japan began to retreat from East Timor. During this time, the Japanese were encouraging many East Timorese to forge alliances with Indonesia and supported Indonesian nationalism in East Timor. In 1945, at the end of the war, and upon Japanese retreat, Portugal resumed control over the administration of East Timor.

Indonesia

Throughout the 1950's political exiles from West Timor and independence activists from Indonesia began to gather in Portuguese Timor. In 1954 serious negotiations & proposals were drafted to incorporate Portuguese Timor with Indonesia. Abuses of power still flourished in East Timor under colonial rule, while simultaneously much criticism of Portugal's colonial empire was taking place on the continent. In 1956 the Portuguese Under-Secretary of Overseas Affairs, José Manuel Barroso (Magone 2005, 54) visited East Timor and was astonished to see the sad state of affairs in the country. Upon leaving, he delivered a 17-page instruction to the governor of Portuguese Timor reporting the abuses and injustices he had witnessed and demanded that they be corrected. Resentment of Portuguese colonial rule was growing across the globe due to the human rights abuses, labor exploitation, greed, excess, and the violence against East Timorese. This resentment fostered the amalgamation of different parties from within Portugal, Indonesia, East Timor to unite and resist Portuguese colonialism in Portuguese Timor. In 1959, the Viqueque rebellion was a sign of what was to come up against Portuguese rule. The rebellion had undergone a long term planning process, was intricate,

highly political in nature and complex. Despite the extensive preparation, the rebellion was halted by Portuguese armed forces within two weeks. But this particular rebellion had led to the forming of unlikely alliances, strengthening and expanding the resistance movement (Alatas 2006, 78).

1974 marks a significant moment for all Portuguese colonies. Upset with Portugal's role in violent colonialism, Portuguese citizens overthrew the Caetano regime in a military coup known as the Carnation Revolution. This resulted in massive Portuguese decolonization worldwide. Having been involved with counter-government rebellions since the 16th century, Timor responded immediately to this opportunity. Whereas under the Portuguese Caetano administration only one party: "*Accao Nacional Popular (ANP)*" was allowed to exist, after the fall of Caetano, several political parties arose (Alatas 2006, xix):

1. **Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT):** Hesitant to seek immediate independence. Advocated for gradual process with assistance from Portugal.
2. **Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FREITILIN):** Called for immediate independence.
3. **Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI):** Supported integration with Indonesia. Contained many leaders from Viqueque revolt.
4. **Klibur Oan Timur Aswain (KOTA):** Advocated reinstatement of traditional tribal leadership.
5. **Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party):** Stood for semi-independence as a commonwealth of Portugal.

There was much fluidity between these groups. Many members would leave one group only to return at a later date, or to join another group and denounce the former. In 1975, the groups began to sense that an invasion from Indonesia was impending. Several organizations believed that if Timor was recognized as an independent nation by the United Nations, then the country would have more international support and be defended by international law in the case of an invasion by Indonesia. On November 30th, 1975 UDT, APODETI, KOTA, and Trabalhista proclaimed East Timor's independence. In response to this effort, Indonesia entered East-Timor, violently taking the capital city of Dili, landing 35,000 troops. Hours prior to the invasion U.S. President Gerald Ford accompanied by Henry Kissinger had flown out of Jakarta. Ninety percent of the arms used by the Indonesian armed forces were supplied by the United States (Glassman 2003, 272).

General Sunarko, the Kopassus general who in Timor in 1999 helped run the militias that burned 80 percent of the buildings in Timor, that conducted church massacres, etc., and who now has been running this assassinations program in Aceh, he said that he was trained by the US military, the US Pacific Command, mobile training teams in jungle warfare, logistics and many other subjects, and he said that he was most recently trained by the US in 2006.

– Allan Nairn, Democracy Now!

The Indonesian occupation has been by far the most violent of all occupations in East Timor. Thousand of Timorese were killed through indiscriminate shooting, beheading, execution, cannibalism, torture, and “disappearances”. Women were systematically raped and forcibly taken as wives, utilized as tools of war. Suspected guerillas were either disemboweled and left in the streets as an example to others, or abducted, taken into helicopters and thrown into the sea. Aside from the clearly traumatizing and sadistic violence, perhaps the most brutal actions taken by the

Indonesian military were the “Scorched Earth” policies that ensued. The military burned and destroyed absolutely everything, from agriculture to infrastructure to homes, leaving nothing behind.

Just one month after invasion, the Indonesian forces established “The Provisional Government of East Timor.” Then in July 1976, Indonesia annexed East Timor as its 27th province. Neither actions were acknowledged nor accepted by the United Nations. Yet regardless, the Indonesian government moved forward as if these actions were legitimized and increased their presence.

A key force in opposing the Indonesian presence, in addition to Timorese groups were Portuguese sympathizers. Due to the excessively violent nature of Indonesia’s occupation, a certain nostalgia developed within the populous of East Timor for the way of life under Portuguese rule. There were groups trained and supported by the Portuguese Armed Forces, as well as containing former soldiers of the Portuguese military. The most famous of these groups would be: Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste: *FALINTIL*. This group was the military wing of the political party FRETILIN. This group maintained steady, armed resistance against Indonesian occupation throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

THE PATHWAY TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

The conflicts in East Timor did not go unreported, but it was difficult for foreign and certainly, domestic journalists to gather information and export it to the world under the violent restrictions. The Santa Cruz Cemetery Massacre changed that. On November 12, 1991 Timorese demonstrators were recognizing the death of a *FALINTIL* member.

During the honorary funeral procession/protest, Indonesian forces opened fire at Santa Cruz Cemetery, killing hundreds (Glassman 2003, 273). Whereas other attacks in the past had been more deadly, this particular incident was filmed and subsequently snuck out of the country. Once the footage was out of the country, it was shown on all major television networks and inspired much international concern and involvement with the situation in East Timor. Due to the international outcry, Indonesian General Tri Sutrisino was forced to respond to the incident. His response was partly as follows: *“The protesters had spread chaos...they persisted with their misdeeds...In the end, they had to be shot. These ill-bred people have to be shot...and we will shoot them.”* (UNHCR). This only fueled the international solidarity and support for the East Timorese against Indonesian occupation. The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, a study released in 2001 reports that the minimum damage done between 1974 and 1999 are at least: 102,800 conflict-related deaths, 18,600 killings, 84,200 'excess' deaths from hunger and illness (CAVR).

In 1998 due to economic meltdown in Indonesia, Indonesian President Suharto resigned. President Suharto is attributed with much of the policy of violence that plagued East Timor. Vice President Habibie took control as president. In 1999, in a surprise move, President Habibie announced a referendum to be voted on by the East Timorese that gave them the choice to decide their preferred government, either to continue with special autonomy status within Indonesia or to move forward as an independent nation. UNAMET: *United Nations Advanced Mission in East Timor* was deployed to East Timor in order to prepare for, and administer the polling (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, 128) Leading up to voting, violence increases, including violence against UNAMET

employees. Most of the violence in opposition to the referendum came from anti-independence, particularly pro-Indonesia forces, fearing that the referendum would result in favor of Timorese Independence. On August 30th, 1999 the referendum took place. An unusual quiet was reported during the day of voting. When the results came in, it was clear that an overwhelming 78% majority of the 98% of eligible voters that came out to cast their vote, favored independence (Kingsbury 2009, 101).

The state, by its very nature views itself as the legitimate authority, which it maintains through a monopoly of violence. Therefore, any claims against the state are considered to be illegitimate and detrimental to the authority of the state. This challenge then legitimates and warrants state sponsored violence. This violent reaction was exactly what took place the day after the elections were held. Following the ballot results, the largest campaign of destruction took place at the hand of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia-TNI (*Indonesia National Army*), anti-independence militias, and pro-Indonesia factions. The situation became so increasingly violent that UNAMET was withdrawn to Australia, though they had promised to stay in the region as a peacekeeping force after the elections. “Operation Clean Sweep”: ransacked, burned, looted, and pillaged what was left of East Timor after essentially, centuries of struggle. 300,000 refugees fled or were forced into West Timor. 200,000 people were displaced to take refuge in the mountains, where many of the pro-independence rebel groups had taken residence. 1,000 citizens were murdered and 70% of homes, public buildings, and essential services were destroyed (CAVR). In the wake of Operation Clean Sweep, International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), which served as the multinational peacekeeping arm of UNAMET, arrived in East-Timor forcing the Indonesian militias across the border into West-Timor. INTERFET remained

in the region from 1999-2000. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in order to maintain peace, order and security, provide medical relief and support rebuilding of infrastructure. East Timor essentially became a protectorate of the United Nations until the presidential election in 2002. It should be noted that certain scholars have criticized this support as a form of UN-colonialism. The argument in brief is that the United Nations makes all decisions of when and how it will enter a country, then later decides according to its own guidelines how it will leave the country. It works to provide protection for the people and guard borders. Much of this behavior is succinct with that of colonial powers.

Exactly two years after the referendum was voted on, on May 20th, 2002 the Elections for Constituent Assembly were held. In the elections, it was made very clear that the political party the citizenry felt most represented by was the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN). These results only reinforced that the political inclination of the majority was toward an independent East Timor. Given the opportunity to self determine by directly participating in a democratic election, it is clear that occupation and colonialism were not favored by the citizens of Timor. The successful elections resulted in Timor-Leste formally declaring independence on May 20, 2002 becoming the world's first new country of the new millennium. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão was elected to be the first president of the independent nation. Gusmão was a former militant in the organization FRETILIN and a long time advocate for Timorese independence. His involvement with the anti-colonial movement led to his capture and imprisonment by the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT). He was sentenced to 20 years by the Indonesian government and was released after serving seven of the years. The

election of an individual such as Gusmão, with the history he has, sent a message to Timor-Leste and the world that Timorese were ready for a government that provided a semblance of self-determination rather than being under the control of a violent and oppressive colonial regime.

Summary of the National Parliament of East Timor election results		
Parties	Votes %	Seats
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente) FRETILIN	57.4	55
Democratic Party (Partido Democrático)	8.7	7
Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata)	8.2	6
Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associação Social-Democrata Timorese)	7.8	6
Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática Timorese)	2.4	2
Timorese Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Timorese)	2.2	2
Association of Timorese Heroes (Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain)	2.1	2
People's Party of Timor (Partido do Povo de Timor)	2.0	2
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cristão)	2.0	2
Socialist Party of Timor (Partido Socialista de Timor)	1.8	1
Liberal Party (Partai Liberal)	1.1	1
Christian Democratic Party of Timor (Partido Democrata-Cristão de Timor)	0.7	1
Non-partisan	1	
Total turnout	91.3	88
Source: UNTAET/CNN/Adam Carr. The parliament was elected as Constituent Assembly		

Following Gusmão's presidency, José Manuel Ramos-Horta was elected in 2007. Ramos-Horta was also involved in the independence movement and FRETILIN in Portuguese Timor, resulting in his exile from 1970-1971. Ramos-Horta's election was further affirmation of the independence-oriented sentiment held by the voting citizenry.

In 2006 various factors from agricultural to political, began to challenge the legitimacy of the new democratically elected government. Increases in the price of rice

from \$10 to \$35, in spite of sufficient supply (Glover 1977, 43), was having effects on the nation's food security, security forces were having great difficulty in maintaining safe borders, particularly against smugglers (Kingsbury 2009, 19). Furthermore, it was discovered that border police were involved with the smuggling, undermining the legitimacy of the state and raising concerns whether or not the new government would be able to maintain control over the country. Demographic issues, such as an increasing population of youth under the age of 15 (CIA), and an increase in emigration due to lack of economic opportunities in the country. Military violence and the continued dependence on foreign aid also contributed to the determination of the status of Timor-Leste as a failing state.

In 2007 Timor-Leste was declared a "Failed State" by the Fund for Peace (www.fundforpeace.org). The country was removed from the list in 2008 and returned in 2009. When discussing failed states it is important to define what the criterion are to be considered as such. The guidelines for this particular research organization the countries are measured utilizing 12 indicators:

Social Indicators

- I-1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
- I-2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies
- I-3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
- I-4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators

- I-5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
- I-6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political Indicators

- I-7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
- I-8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
- I-9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights
- I-10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"
- I-11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
- I-12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors (www.fundforpeace.org)

In 2008 there was an attempted assassination of democratically elected president: José Ramos-Horta and then Prime Minister Gusmao, which led to further unrest and questions of legitimacy.

LEGITIMACY:

Why do states exist?

“One answer to this question is that states exist because of the need for groups of people to have a formal and complex set of geographical defined institutions in order to represent their external interests...but more importantly, states also exist, normatively, to embody the will of their citizens, and to reflect a capacity and intention to manifest that will. If that will is the expression of the nations institutional control of its territory, then the state is legitimate as an expression of that will (the confluence being the “nation-state”). If the state is an expression of national will that is based principally on ethnic identity, then the state remains legitimate insofar as it can claim to represent all of the peoples identified with the nation. Where the state fails to represent all of the people of the nation there may also competing claims to territory occupied by the (sometimes “imagined”) national group not within the existing state boundaries” (Kingsbury 2009, 20).

Who is determining what the criterions are in order to be considered legitimate?

In the case of Timor-Leste, the country had, in the 20th and 21st century gone through 61 leaders: 41 governors, 2 Allied Commissioners in 2 years, 3 Japanese Commissioners in 3 years, 1 Chief Minister, 5 Prime Ministers, 2 UN Administrators, and 7 Presidents (http://www.worldstatesmen.org/East_Timor.html). Through the consistently shifting regimes, the State continued to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The country has been plagued by things such as food insecurity, war, economic meltdown, lack of access to education, inability to protect borders, forced labor, dispossession, human rights abuses, government corruption, assassinations, smuggling, poor health, and poverty. Governments were either overthrown by invading forces or taken down domestically

through citizen and military coup de tat. This constant flux certainly made it difficult for any citizen to view their government as entirely legitimate.

In a Weberian sense, a legitimate state has monopoly over the use of force/violence and the ability to replicate itself. Based on this model, East Timor would, throughout its colonial and occupied history have been a legitimate government, save for the moments of citizen uprising. From a theoretical perspective the use of state violence was certainly monopolized and effective in determining the actions of the citizenry. From a practical standpoint, it would be difficult to argue that all of those under colonial rule believed in the government as legitimate (Roberts 2008, 545). Particularly as the population was not being provided basic needs such as food security, health, and education under those regimes. Though Weber would advocate for the rational-legal legitimacy provided in democratic state structure, when legitimacy is acquired solely through a show of force, such as in the case of occupation, and also in a democratic state, particularly by an individual or a group that does not identify with those being ruled, it is unlikely that power will not be challenged. So whereas the Weberian approach sees politics as taking place from within the sphere of government, in the case of East Timor it appears more fitting that the true politics essentially takes place in the sphere of citizen resistance, and particularly resistance to occupation.

Furthermore, where is the place for indigenous forms of determining legitimacy? Prior to colonial rule, Timor had regional rulers known as *liu rai*, which translates to 'earth lord' (Kingsbury 2009, 10). In pre-colonial rule, legitimacy would have been sustained by the *liu rai* through the maintenance of natural resources and general community harmony. This indigenous form of governance is more closely aligned with

the notion of “Positive Legitimacy”: where an individual has the “right” to rule via consent. This consent is granted to an individual through, for instance, the public declaration of certain terms of a social contract by said individual. This positive legitimacy abides by, in a consistent manner, just laws and rules set forth by the society.

Positive Legitimacy is more succinct with the theories of Hannah Arendt than those of Weber. Arendt theorizes that the politically active are rooted and emancipated in the notion of power, that power originates through political activity and political action. By engaging in political discussion with one’s community in a public sphere, without the influence of what is traditionally considered “private interest”, Arendt argues that this is when the citizen indeed reinforces their citizenship. This participation does more than recognize dissent within the community; it functions as a political agency. According to Arendt this public political agency is the determining factor in legitimacy, rather than state imposed violence and control.

What is particularly interesting in the case of Timor-Leste when reviewing Arendt’s approach is the idea of Identity Construction. Generally, many revolutionary organizations are centered on identifications such as race, class, nationality, or religion. Timor-Leste is ethnically, linguistically, and socially diverse yet throughout history it has been made clear that the subject these diverse groups continue to rally around is an idea of nationalism, when that “nation” is being threatened by an occupying force. Therefore, it is clear that much allegiance within resistance groups is more geographically defined, which in turn lends to great diversity within the movement.

SELF DETERMINATION

If the primary impetus behind rallying against an occupying force is a sense of “nationalism” and the unrest is based on past tragedies such as abuses of power, dictatorship, civil wars, violent colonization, economic exploitation, and terrible human rights violations as opposed to class, race, and religious reasons how does this group determine leadership? And if the goal is to be “self-determining” than the question arises: Who is self determining whom? State Authority is questioned and critiqued far more than issues of identification based on a nationalist framework. From the 2002 and subsequent elections it is made clear that though an individual may be from an indigenous, Portuguese or any variety of religious background, the determining factor in the minds of Timorese is that individuals dedication and commitment to fighting against occupation. Furthermore, this resistance to occupation cannot be simply to further the individual’s power, economic status, influence, but to further the standard of living for all citizens of Timor-Leste. This Positive Legitimacy is neither based upon a specific political party, though independence parties have clearly been favored by voters in elections. Through the multiple, different, overlapping histories, a common culture of resistance has certainly been developed and maintains centuries deep roots.

CONCLUSION

Much of what Timor-Leste is today was built upon those centuries of struggle, but will Timor-Leste be able to maintain an entirely participatory democracy in an Arendtian sense or will the democratically elected government be forced to utilize Weberian modes of control through a clear monopoly of force? It is rather evident through Timor-Leste’s

past that a monopoly of violence is virtually impossible to sustain and where it has existed it does not last long. Yet now with independence-oriented, revolutionary leaders holding positions of governmental influence, the country still struggles with maintaining legitimacy. Clearly, being considered a failed state is indicative of complex problematics within the state, even as it exists today. Considering the infancy of Timor-Leste as an independent nation, coupled with its traumatic history it seems more than reasonable to believe that the country is going to take quite some time before being able to regain the trust of the citizenry, economic stability, social equity, food security, fair access to education, so on and so forth. Furthermore, though Timor-Leste has been recognized as an independent nation by the world community, there are still concerted efforts by organizations within and outside of Timor-Leste to rescind that status. What has been proven in Timor-Leste's recent history is that in order to have successful rule over the country it is imperative to gain the trust of the population, not through force but through a sense of solidarity. The government today is constantly in flux balancing these two paradigms; where they must show humbleness yet maintain a show of legitimate force. Timor-Leste will be an interesting case study to observe into the future as to where nations may go after being decolonized yet remain thoroughly entrenched in global capitalism. The Timorese people have proven themselves to be strong willed and perseverant. May the coming generations not forget the struggles that have plagued this tropical island, and may they never forget how to say *Chega!* (Enough, Stop) to future imperial forces.

APPENDIX



Map of Timor-Leste



Geography of Timor-Leste



Official Seal of Timor-Leste



Most Current Flag of Timor-Leste

Works Cited and References

- Alatas, Ali. 2006. *The pebble in the shoe: the diplomatic struggle for East Timor*. Ali Alatas. Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, Jakarta.
- Building Human Security in Indonesia.
http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/maps_wtimor_actors.php (accessed April 2010).
- Carey, Peter B. R. 1995. *East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Democracy Now! <http://www.democracynow.org> Democracy Now! (accessed April 2010).
- Glassman, James F. 2003. Structural Power, Agency and National Liberation: The Case of East Timor. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 28, no. 3. New Series (September): 264-280.
- Glover, Ian C. 1977. The late stone age in eastern Indonesia. *Indonesia Circle. School of Oriental & African Studies. Newsletter* 5, no. 12: 6.
- Gunn, Geoffrey C. 1999. *Timor Loro Sae : 500 years*. Coleção Estudos e documentos. Macau: Livros do Oriente, Macau .
- Kingsbury, Damien. 2009. *East Timor: The Price of Liberty*. 1st ed. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY.
- Magone, José M. 2005. José Manuel Durão Barroso: A Political Scientist in the World of European Union Politics. *International Journal* 60, no. 2 (Spring): 544-552.
- Martin, Ian, and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh. 2005. The United Nations and East Timor: from self-determination to state-building. *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 1: 125.
- Official Web Gateway to the Government of Timor Leste. <http://www.gov.east-timor.org/index.php> (accessed April 2010).
- Rae, James Deshaw. 2009. *Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in East Timor*. First Forum Press, Boulder, CO.
- Roberts, David. 2008. Post-conflict Statebuilding and State Legitimacy: From Negative to Positive Peace? *Development and Change* 39, no. 4: 537-555.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/#CitPubSph> (accessed April 2010).

The Economist Intelligence Unit. *Country Unit-Timor Leste*. NY., New York. January 2010

The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). <http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/> (accessed April 2010).

The World Bank. <http://web.worldbank.org> (accessed April 2010).

The World Statesman. East Timor. http://www.worldstatesmen.org/East_Timor.html (accessed April 2010).

UNHCR. UN Refugee Agency. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a9b9c.html> (accessed April 2010).

U.S. AID Asia. <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/etimor/> (accessed April 2010).

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. World Factbook: East Timor. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html> (accessed April 2010).